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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by
because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet which
have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound inter-
stitial change in the very tissue of the law."-OLIEa WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.
Recent Cases
AVAILABILITY TO THE ACCUSED OF DOCUMENTS IN THE
POSSESSION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE PURPOSE
OF IMPEACHING GOVERNMENT WITNESSES
Jencks v. United States'
In this case, the defendant, an officer of a labor union, filed an "Affidavit of
Non-Communist Union Officer" with the National Labor Relations Board as re-
1. 353 U. S. 657 (1957).
1
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quired by section 9 (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 He was then indicted on two counts
for the alleged violation of federal law3 by falsely swearing in that affidavit that he
was not a member or affiliated with the Communist Party on April 28, 1950. The
defendant was convicted on both counts by the district court and his petition for
a new trial was denied. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the conviction 4 and also the order denying the motion for a new trial.5 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.6
The two principal government witnesses were H. F. Matusow and J. W. Ford,
who were Communist Party members paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
to make oral and written reports to the F.B.I. concerning the Communist Party
activities in which they were currently participating. They made many such reports
concerning the defendant, about which they testified at trial. The defendant contends
that the trial court erred in refusing his motions to produce these records for in-
spection and use in cross-examining the two witnesses who had made them. Further
error was alleged on the instructions to the jury concerning credibility of informers.7
The Supreme Court reversed with Mr. Justice Brennan delivering the opinion of
the Court.
It seems as though the sole reason for the trial court's refusal to order a produc-
tion of the files was on the ground that a preliminary foundation of inconsistency
had not been laid between the contents of the report and the testimony of the wit-
nesses. It further appears that this was the reason that the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the refusal to order the production of these reports.8 The Supreme Court
held, on the contrary, that the petitioner was not required to lay a preliminary
foundation of inconsistency because a sufficient foundation was established by the
testimony of the witnesses to the effect that their reports concerned events and
activities about which they were testifying.9 The Court went on to say that the
court of appeals misinterpreted the opinion in Gordon -v. United States'0 and that
that case did not require a preliminary showing of inconsistency.1 '
It is submitted that the Gordon case can be distinguished from the instant case
on the grounds that in the Gordon case the witness admitted, upon cross-examination,
that he had made prior inconsistent statements and that the Government was in
2. 61 Stat. 146, as amended, 65 Stat. 601, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (h).
3. 62 Stat. 749, 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
4. Jencks v. United States, 226 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1955).
5. Id. at 553. The motion for a new trial was made on the grounds that one
of the government's main witnesses had recanted, but the district court held that
he told the truth at the hearing on the motion at which he claimed that he lied at the
trial.
6. 350 U. S. 980 (1956).
7. 353 U. S. at 659. The court felt that it was unnecessary to consider the alleged
errors in instructions because of their disposition of the case.
8. 226 F.2d at 552. On this point -the court cited the following: Gordon v.
United States, 344 U. S. 414 (1953); Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U. S.
214 (1951); Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942).
9. 353 U. S. at 666.
10. 344 U. S. 414 (1953).
11. 353 U. S. at 666.
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possession of these inconsistent statements.1 2 On the other hand, it was never shown
in the Jencks case that the witness had made prior inconsistent statements, but
rather, that the witness had made reports which were in the Government's posses-
sion.13 Further, Mr. Justice Jackson in announcing the opinion of the Court in the
Gordon case, said, "By proper cross-examination, defense counsel laid a foundation
for his demand by showing that the documents were in existence, were in the posses-
sion of the Government, were made by the Government's witness under examination,
were contradictory of his present testimony, and that the contradiction was as to
relevant, important and material matters which directly bore on the main issue
being tried: the participation of the accused in the crime. The demand was for pro-
duction of these specific documents and did not propose any broad or blind fishing
expedition among documents possessed by the Government on the chance that some-
thing impeaching might turn up. '1 4 In the Jencks case, the Court cited the latter
part of the preceding statement and went on to say, "We reaffirm and re-emphasize
these essentials."15 The Court then quoted another portion of the Gordon case as
authority for their proposition that no preliminary foundation of inconsistency need
be laid, in which it was said that "For production purposes, it need only appear
that the evidence is relevant, competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule ..... 16
Upon examination of the Gordon case it was found that the above statement was
made when the Court was speaking of the admissibility of the inconsistent statements
once they had been produced, and was not said in reference to the problem as to
whether or not the Court should force the Government to produce them as the Court
in the Jencks case seemed to infer.lT
After finding it unnecessary that a preliminary foundation of inconsistency be
laid, the Court gave the following order, ".... the petitioner was entitled to an order
directing the Government to produce for inspection all reports of Matusow and Ford
in its possession, written and, when orally made, as recorded by the FB.I., touching
the events and activities as to which they testified at the trial."' 8 (Emphasis added.)
Perhaps the scope of such a statement might be broader than the statement the Court
had made early in the opinion to the effect that an essential element for the produc-
tion of documents was that "'[t] he demand was for production of . . . specific docu-
ments and did not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition . .. on the chance
that something impeaching might turn up.' (Emphasis added.) 344 U. S., at 419."' 1 9
At this point it will be interesting to observe that the defendant's requests for
inspection were limited to only a certain few reports dealing with only specified
meetings and conversations and for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the
important government witnesses. Further, the defendant did not ask to see the docu-
12. 344 U. S. at 416.
13. 353 U. S. at 666.
14. 344 U. S. at 418.
15. 353 U. S. at 667.
16. 344 U. S. at 420 quoted in 353 U. S. at 667.
17. See 344 U. S. at 420.
18. 353 U. S. at 668.
19. 353 U. S. at 667.
3
et al.: Editorial Board/Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ments himself, but instead, only that these specified reports be turned over to the
trial court to determine their value for impeachment purposes, and then, if they were
of value and unprivileged, to allow the defendant to use them.20 Instead of allowing
the defendant his request, the Court went further and held that the defendant was
entitled to inspect the reports, the reason being that only the defense was adequately
equipped to determine their use in furthering the accused's defense. "The practice
of producing government documents to the trial judge for his determination of
relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is disapproved."21 The Court
handled the problem of its order being broader than requested by the petitioner
by making the following statement, "The petitioner's counsel, believing that Court
of Appeals' decisions imposed such a qualification, restricted his motions to a request
for production of the reports to the trial judge for the judge's inspection and deter-
mination whether and to what extent the reports should be made available to the
petitioner."22 It is submitted that there might be a question raised as to the adequacy
of this reason that the Court gives for deciding a question broader in scope than the
one presented.
In the Jencks' case, one other important consideration was presented, to wit,
the great national interest in not having certain documents in the possession of the
F.B.I. publically disclosed for fear that such disclosure would decrease the effective-
ness of that government agency. The court handled this problem by claiming that
the Supreme Court noticed, in United States v. Reynolds,2 3 the holdings of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit2 4 that in criminal causes ". . . the Government
can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go
free."25 It will be observed that the Court in the Reynolds case, after making the
above statement, went on to say that it had no application in that case because it was
a civil case, and not a criminal case.26 In light of this fact, it will be noticed that
the Supreme Court has in no case specifically accepted the doctrine that the Govern-
ment has the choice of protecting the national interest by non-disclosure of vital
documents by the Government at the price of allowing the defendant to go free.
The holdings of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that were cited in
conjunction with the Reynolds case were the cases of United States v. Andolscheck27
20. See 353 U. S. at 673 n.1, reading as follows: "In his brief, petitioner states:
'Petitioner asked only that the reports be 1roduced to the trial judge so that he
could examine them and determine whether they had evidentiary value for im-
peachment purposes. Petitioner sought access only to those portions of the reports
having this value. The motion therefore proposed no broad foray into the govern-
ment's files and afforded the judge every opportunity to protect the government's
legitimate privilege as to the matters not connected with this case."'
21. 353 U. S. at 669.
22. 353 U. S. at 670.
23. 345 U. S. 1 (1953).
24. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v.
Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946).
25. 353 U. S. at 671.
26. 345 U. S. at 12.
27. 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
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and United States v. Beelcman.28 Although these cases are more formidable authority
than the Reynolds case, they both might be distinguished on the grounds that the
basis for the refusal was the general regulations of the O.P.A. and of the Treasury
Department prohibiting officers of these agencies from publishing agency documents
for any reason. Further, there was no showing in either case -that the production of
the documents could seriously threaten vital national interest or hamper the function-
ing of an important security agency of the Government. Concerning the problem of
national security, the attention of the reader might also be called to the Gordon case.
There the Court stated, "The Government did not assert any privilege for the docu-
ments on grounds of national security, confidential character, public interest, or
otherwise."29 Concededly, this was only dictum, but the mere presence of such a
statement reflects, by implication, the feeling of the court that the absence of such
factors builds a stronger case in favor of the inspection of the documents by the
other party.
In the Jenccs case, Mr. Justice Brennan in delivering the opinion of the Court
was speaking for himself and four other justices. Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Mr.
Justice Harlan, concurred separately stating that he believed the case should be
reversed on the ground of prejudicial error in the instructions given by the trial
court to the jury. He disagreed with the majority on the point of turning over the
documents in question to the accused and stated that they should instead have
been given to the -trial court for inspection for inconsistencies as requested by the
accused. Mr. Justice Clark dissented, stating that the documents should not be turned
over to the defendant for national security reasons and that it would seriously impair
the efficiency of the F.BJ., but he did approve of the practice of turning them over
to the trial court for inspection for inconsistencies with testimony that had been
given.
The exact precedent that was established by the Jencks case is far from clear,
but it can be conservatively said that the decision will have the effect of giving an
accused person greater accessibility to the confidential files of the F.BJ. than before.
It was felt by many that, at a minimum, the efficiency of the F.B.I. would be greatly
decreased if they would have to work in constant fear of eventually having to choose,
in many cases, between making their files public or not prosecuting persons who
were believed to have committed serious crimes. Congress immediately recognized
the impending danger and, as a result, passed a statute which greatly modified, if
not abolished, any precedent set by the Jencks case.s 0 The statute attempts parti-
ally to protect the internal security of the F.B.I. while at the same time protecting
persons on trial from being convicted on false or inconsistent testimony of Govern-
ment witnesses. The statute provides, in essence, the following:
"a. In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement
or report in the possession of the United States... shall be the subject
28. 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946).
29. 344 U. S. at 419.
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of . . , inspection until said witness has testified ... in the trial of the
case.
"b. After a witness called by the United States has testified . , the court
shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement... of the witness in the possession of the United States which
relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the
entire contents of... statement relate to the subject matter of the testi-
mony .... the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the de-
fendant ....
"c. If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced...
contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testi-
mony .... the court shall order the United States to deliver such state-
ment for the inspection of the court in camera . . . [T]he court shall
excise the portions of such statement which do not relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness. With such material excised, the
court shall then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for
his use . . . [T]he court ... may recess . . . for such time . . . required
for the examination by said defendant and his preparation for its use in
the trial.
"d. If the United States elects not to comply with an order... under para-
graph (b) and (c) . . . , the court shall strike from the record the testi-
mony of the witness . . . , unless . . . the interests of justice require that
a mistrial be declared."
Although the effectiveness of this statute has not yet been judicially interpreted, it
seems to spell out the rights of the accused ,and the rights of the Government much
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